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SHAROD THOMAS,  
    Appellant 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Crim. No. 1-12-cr-00378-001) 
District Judge: Hon. Renée Marie Bumb 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 




BEFORE: MCKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 





                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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MCKEE, Chief Judge 
 
 Sharod Thomas appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. 
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.1  
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with the facts and 
procedural history, we set forth only those details necessary to our conclusion. The 
government charged Thomas in a three-count indictment with: (1) possession of a firearm 
after a felony conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count I); (2) possession of 
heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (Count 
II); and (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count III).  
 This appeal arises from a retrial of Thomas that followed a mistrial. The district 
court conducted the retrial in two phases. During the first, the court tried only the 
possession of heroin and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 
crime charges (Counts II and III). The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. In the 
second phase, which focused on Count I, Thomas stipulated that he had previously been 
convicted of a felony. The district court then instructed the jury on the three elements of 
possession of a firearm after a felony conviction: “In order to find the defendant guilty of 
this count . . . you must find . . . beyond a reasonable doubt” (1) that the defendant “was 
previously convicted of a felony”; (2) that “after his conviction,” the defendant 
“knowingly possessed a firearm”; and (3) that the defendant’s “possession was in or 
                                              
1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).  
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affecting interstate or foreign commerce.”2 The court defined the first element for the jury 
and correctly noted that it had already defined the second element during the first phase 
of the trial. However, the court mistakenly told the jury that it had previously provided an 
instruction on the interstate commerce element, when, in fact, it had not. When the 
district court asked if either party objected to these instructions, neither defense counsel 
nor the prosecutor objected.  
 Moments after sending the jury to deliberate, the district court realized it had 
failed to define the third element of Count I: interstate commerce. To remedy this 
omission, it recalled the jury and proposed a supplemental instruction defining interstate 
commerce. Although Thomas agreed that this supplemental instruction was substantively 
correct, he objected to the proposed remedy. He argued that the instruction might 
pressure the jury to return a verdict quickly. The court overruled Thomas’ objection and 
gave the supplemental instruction. In doing so, the court first repeated all three elements 
of the § 922(g)(1) offense and then defined the interstate commerce element. 
 Shortly after receiving the amended instructions, the jury returned a guilty verdict 
on Count I. After the court imposed sentence, Thomas filed this appeal, challenging his 




                                              






 Thomas contends that the district court’s initial failure to define the interstate 
commerce element constitutes plain error. We disagree for two reasons. First, the district 
court’s immediate supplementation of its initial definition remedied any deficiency in its 
original instruction. The Supreme Court has explained that a “district court can often 
correct . . . [a procedural] mistake so that it cannot possibly affect the ultimate outcome.”3 
Moreover, a jury instruction is not in error if “‘taken as a whole and viewed in the light of 
the evidence, [the instruction] fairly and adequately submits the issues in the case to the 
jury [without confusing or misleading the jurors].’”4 Here, it cannot seriously be disputed 
that the district court’s prompt corrective action mitigated any deficiency in the original 
instruction, and there was no error in the charge the district court ultimately gave. 
 Moreover, Thomas cannot show that the district court’s initial omission of the 
interstate commerce definition prejudiced him. In plain error review, we only reverse the 
district court if we conclude the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.5 The 
                                              
3 Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009). 
4 United States v. Simon, 995 F.2d 1236, 1243 n.11 (3d Cir. 1993) (alterations in original) 
(quoting United States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 789 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting United 
States v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183, 1195 (3d Cir.1984))); see United 
States v. Crawford, 498 Fed. App’x. 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2012) (not precedential) (no error 
where the district court misstated the law when reading one of its jury instructions and 
then corrected the mistake). 
5 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (“The third and final limitation on 
appellate authority under Rule 52(b) is that the plain error affect substantial rights. This is 
the same language employed in Rule 52(a), and in most cases it means that the error must 
have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see Neder v. United 
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evidence with respect to the interstate commerce element was overwhelming. The 
government introduced evidence that the firearm at issue was manufactured in Ohio and 
sold to a purchaser in Nevada.6 The ammunition that the police found in the weapon was 
made in Idaho and Illinois.7 Thomas did not dispute any of this evidence.8 Instead, in 
closing, defense counsel stated he did not “have any problem with” the testimony that 
“the gun . . . moved in interstate commerce.”9 Given this strong and uncontested 
evidence, the initial omission of the interstate commerce definition could not have altered 
the outcome of the trial.10 Accordingly, no plain error occurred.  
 Thomas’ reliance on United States v. Retos11 and United States v. Xavier12 to argue 
the contrary is misplaced. In those cases, we held that district court failures to provide 
complete jury instructions constituted plain error because the evidence offered to support 
the omitted elements was not overwhelming.13 That is simply not the situation here. 
Therefore, the district court’s original omission was harmless.  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999) (concluding that “the omission of an element [in a jury 
instruction] is an error that is subject to harmless-error analysis”). 
6 See J.A.II. 367. 
7 See J.A.II. 368-69. 
8 See J.A.II. 2A370-71. 
9 J.A.II. 448. 
10 See United States v. Saybolt, 577 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir. 2009) (in light of the evidence, 
failure to instruct the jury on an element of the charged violation was harmless); United 
States v. Stubbs, 103 F. App’x 471, 474 (3d Cir. 2004) (non-precedential) (holding that 
the district court’s failure to define the interstate commerce element of a § 922(g)(1) 
offense was not prejudicial). 
11 25 F.3d 1220 (3d Cir. 1994). 
12 2 F.3d 1281 (3d Cir. 1993). 




 Second, Thomas argues that the district court’s provision of a supplemental jury 
instruction coerced the jury into rushing its verdict.14 We disagree. We review a district 
court’s decision to give a supplemental jury instruction, and its contents, for abuse of 
discretion.15 Pursuant to that standard, Thomas must show that the supplemental 
instruction, when viewed “in the context of the overall charge,” was “arbitrary, fanciful 
or clearly unreasonable.”16 Furthermore, because the supplemental instruction was legally 
correct, “the district court enjoy[ed] broad discretion in determining how, and under what 
circumstances, that charge [would] be given.”17  
 We have long recognized that “supplemental jury charges should not be used to 
‘blast a hung jury into verdict.’”18 We have also recognized that supplemental charges are 
coercive where the “‘charge caused the jury to be influenced by concerns irrelevant to 
their task’” and reach a “‘subsequent verdict for reasons other than the evidence 
presented to it.’”19 But such a risk does not exist here. The district court gave a 
supplemental instruction immediately after the jury was sent to deliberate, and the 
instruction was directly relevant to the jury’s task. The district court’s amended 
instruction only served to assist the jurors in applying the law to the uncontested evidence 
                                              
14 Appellant’s Br. 15-16.  
15 United States v. Jackson, 443 F.3d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 2006). 
16 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
17 United States v. Civelli, 883 F.2d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. 
Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 536 (1947)). 
18 Jackson, 443 F.3d at 297 (quoting United States v. Burley, 460 F.2d 998, 999 (3d Cir. 
1972) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
19 United States v. Boone, 458 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Jackson, 443 F.3d at 
297) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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they heard at trial. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in providing the supplemental instruction. 
 Thomas relies on the jury’s rapid deliberation on the § 922(g)(1) count to support 
his coercion argument.20 He claims that the instruction must have been coercive because 
“a verdict of guilty was returned not more than three minutes” 21 after the district court 
provided the supplemental instruction. But the jury’s quick verdict in this case is not 
surprising. Thomas had stipulated to his felony conviction, satisfying the first element of 
§ 922(g)(1) off the bat. Moreover, in convicting Thomas of the § 924(c) count during the 
first phase of the trial, the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Thomas knowingly 
possessed the firearm. This established the second element of § 922(g)(1). Finally, as 
previously explained, Thomas did not contest the government’s evidence that the firearm 
and ammunition traveled in interstate commerce. Thus, the third and final element of 
§ 922(g)(1) also was not a matter of serious debate. Accordingly, the strength of the 
evidence, not the supplemental instruction, likely accounts for the swiftness of the jury’s 
decision.  
                                              
20 Appellant Br. 17-19. 
21 Appellant’s Br. 18. To support this theory, Thomas represents that our decision in 
Snyder v. Claudio, 68 F.3d 1573, 1576 (3d Cir. 1995), found “‘impermissible coercion of 
juror when original jury required four hours to render verdict but reconstituted jury 
required only twenty-nine minutes.’” Appellant’s Br. 17 (quoting Snyder, 68 F.3d at 
1576). However, this direct quotation comes from a parenthetical summarizing a Ninth 
Circuit decision. Snyder, 68 F.3d at 1576. In reality, Snyder holds nothing of relevance to 
the present appeal. 
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 Thomas also suggests that the district court should have instructed the jury to 
begin its deliberations anew after providing the supplemental instruction.22 However, as 
the government points out,23 Thomas rejected this course of action when the 
governmental proposed it at trial, stating that he would prefer the deliberations to 
continue instead of beginning anew.24 This Court will not review alleged errors that the 
defendant invited or induced.25 We reject Thomas’ claim that the jury should have re-
initiated its deliberations because Thomas himself thwarted that course of action.  
 Finally, we note that even if the supplemental instruction were somehow coercive, 
any such coercion would be harmless. As previously explained, Thomas stipulated that he 
was a career offender; the jury had already found Thomas knowingly possessed the 
firearm and ammunition; and the evidence that the firearm and ammunition traveled in 
interstate commerce was uncontested. Given this overwhelming evidence, a guilty verdict 
on the § 922(g)(1) count was inevitable. Accordingly, any abuse of discretion that did 
occur was harmless. 
 
 
                                              
22 Appellant’s Br. 16-17. 
23 Appellee Br. at 24-25. 
24 J.A.II. 481. When the district court discovered its omission, the government suggested 
that the district court direct the jurors “to start their deliberations anew.” J.A.II. 481. 
When the court responded “Okay,” Thomas immediately objected, stating: “I’m going to 
object to that too because, again, I think it’s only reemphasizing that what was going on 
was improper, and it wasn’t. I think they should just be told to go on deliberating.” J.A.II. 
481 (emphasis added). 
25 See United States v. Kolodesh, 787 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2015); United States v. 
Stewart, 185 F.3d 112, 127 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 660 




 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court’s judgment. Thomas 
has failed to show that the district court committed a plain error in omitting the definition 
of interstate commerce from its initial instruction. Likewise, Thomas has not shown that 
the district court abused its discretion in providing a substantively-correct supplemental 
instruction immediately after the jury began its deliberations.  
